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What reforms for the credit rating industry? 
A European perspective 
Karel Lannoo 
redit rating agencies (CRAs) continue to find 
themselves in the eye of the storm. Despite having 
singled out the industry early on in the financial 
crisis as needing more regulation, policy-makers seem not to 
be reassured by the measures that have been adopted in the 
meantime, and want to go further. Faced with a rapid 
downgrading in ratings in the context of the sovereign debt 
crisis, European Commissioner Michel Barnier raised the 
possibility last May of creating a new EU-level rating 
agency that would specialise in sovereign debt.  
The debate on the role of rating agents considerably pre-
dates this crisis. As early as the 1997 South-East Asia crisis, 
the delayed reaction of rating agents to the public finance 
situation of these countries was strongly criticised. The 
same criticism of CRAs was levelled in the dot.com bubble 
in 2001. Many reports were written on their role in that 
episode, but it was not until mid-2008 that a consensus 
emerged in the EU that the industry was in need of statutory 
legislation. In the meantime, the US had adopted the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act in 2006. At global level, in 
2003, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) adopted a Statement of Principles 
on the role of credit rating agencies – but apparently the 
initiative has not been successful.  
Rating agents pose a multitude of regulatory problems, none 
of which can be solved easily. Some of these are specific to 
the profession and the current market structure, whereas 
others are of a more generic nature. Some are related to 
basic principles of conduct in the financial services sector, 
while others are part of horizontal market regulation. The 
financial crisis also demonstrated the important role of 
rating agents in financial stability, which involves macro-
prudential authorities. 
This paper starts with an overview of the credit rating 
industry today. The second section analyses the use of credit 
ratings and shows how the authorities have created a captive 
or artificial market for CRAs. Section 3 reviews the new EU 
CRA regulation and its possible impact, and the final 
section compares proposals for regulatory reform. 
The credit ratings industry today 
The credit ratings industry is a global business, controlled 
by a handful of players, two of which are of US parentage. 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s alone control more than 
4/5th of the market. With Fitch, the three leading players 
dominate over 94% of the global market (European 
Commission, 2008). See brief portraits of these three 
companies in Box 1. 
As shown in Table 1, each of the three groups has suffered a 
serious drop in revenues since 2007, especially Fitch, whose 
revenues have declined by 26% since 2007, and its net 
income by 70%. This may confirm the finding discussed 
below that more competition does not necessarily improve 
the quality, but that newcomers, in this case Fitch, attempt 
to attract market share with a short-term strategy. Firms may 
also have abandoned ratings, which cost between €45,000 
and €90,000 per annum, plus 0.05% of total value of a bond 
issue. Table 1 further indicates that the relative market share 
of the three firms has been fairly constant over the period 
2006-09. 
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Table 1. Turnover and net income of the ‘big three’ ratings businesses, 2006-09 ($ millions) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 Δ 07-09 
Moody’s Turnover 2037.1 2259 1775.4 1797.2 -20.4 
 Net income 753.9 701 461.6 407.1 -41.9 
S&P’s Turnover 2750 3046.2 2653.3 2610 -14.3 
 Net income n.a. 440.16 327.8 307.4 -30.2 
Fitch Turnover 655.6 827.4 731.2 613.5 -25.9 
 Net income n.a. 120.2 44 35.8 -70.2 
Sources: 10-K filings to the US SEC by Moody’s and McGraw-Hill, other filings by Fimalac and Hoover, S&P’s and Fitch’s website. 
Box 1. The ‘Big Three’ 
Moody’s investor services was incorporated in 1914 as a 
bond rating and investment analysis company. Today, the 
listed company Moody’s Corporation is the parent company 
of Moody's Investors Service, which provides credit ratings 
and research covering debt instruments and securities, and 
Moody's Analytics, which encompasses non-ratings 
businesses, including risk management software for 
financial institutions, quantitative credit analysis tools, 
economic research and data services, data and analytical 
tools for the structured finance market, and training and 
other professional services. Combined, they employ about 
4,000 persons.  
Standard & Poor’s was incorporated in 1941, following the 
merger of two firms active in credit risk analysis. Both firms 
originated in similar circumstances as Moody’s, in the 
context of the huge industrial expansion of the US in the 
second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. S&P was 
taken over by Mc Graw Hill in 1966, the listed media 
concern, and it forms the most important part of the group in 
terms of revenues, and even more so in profits (about 73%), 
although these have seriously declined since 2007. S&P 
financial services, which includes the ratings service, 
employs about 7,500 persons.  
Fitch Ratings – by far the smaller ‘European’ player in the 
sector with headquarters in New York and London – is part 
of the Fitch Group. The Fitch Group also includes Fitch 
Solutions, a distribution channel for Fitch Ratings products, 
and Algorithmics, a leading provider of enterprise risk 
management solutions. The Fitch Group has been a 
majority-owned subsidiary (60%) of Fimalac S.A. since 
1997, which has headquarters in Paris, and is listed on 
Euronext, but with a very low free float. Fitch grew through 
acquisitions of several smaller ratings agents, including 
IBCA and Duff & Phelps. Fitch employs 2,266 persons. 
That the credit rating business is essentially of American 
parentage should be no surprise, as it is an intrinsic part of 
the market-driven system pioneered by the US. Unlike the 
bank-driven model, which is common in Europe, a market-
driven system relies upon a multi-layered system to make it 
work (Black, 2001). Reputational intermediaries – such as 
investment banks, institutional investors, law firms and 
rating agents – and self-regulatory organisations – such as 
professional federations and standard-setters – play an 
important role to make the system, in between issuers and 
supervisors, work. In effect, financial markets are constantly 
affected by adverse selection mechanisms, and investors 
need third-party tools such as credit ratings in order to 
reduce asymmetric information and increase their ability to 
understand the real risk of financial instruments. 
Since there had not been much of a capital market in Europe 
until recently, banks have essentially performed the credit-
risk analysis function, and continue to do so. But the credit-
risk analysis capacity of European banks declined, possibly 
as a result of the reputational strength of the US capital 
market model. The introduction of the euro and a set of EU 
regulatory measures led to the rapid development of 
European capital markets, and demand for ratings. 
Moreover, European authorities created a captive market for 
an essentially US-based industry. 
A captive market for CRAs in the EU 
Two forms of ‘regulation’ have given the CRAs a captive 
market in the EU: Basel II,1 implemented in Europe as the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), and the liquidity-
providing operations of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Both explicitly use the rating structure of the CRAs to 
determine risk weighting for capital requirement purposes –
thresholds in the former case and ‘haircuts’2 for the ECB’s 
liquidity-providing operations. The United States does not 
use either of these practices, as it has not implemented Basel 
II (largely because because the Federal Reserve did not want 
to have the vast majority of US banks relying on CRAs for 
setting regulatory risk weights), and the discount window of 
the Fed is not based upon ratings. The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 20103 
goes even further, requiring regulators to remove any 
references from their rules to “investment grade” and “credit 
ratings” of securities.4 
                                                        
1 The second set of the recommendations issued in June 2004 by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II creates an 
international standard that banking regulators may use in establishing 
regulations governing how much capital banks must set aside to 
counter the financial and operational risks they face. 
2 A deduction in the market value of securities being held by 
brokerage and investment banking firms as part of net worth for 
calculating their net capital 
3 Public Law 111 - 203 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf). 
4 Clifford Chance (2010), p. 73. 
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The Basel II proposals were finalised in November 2005 
after lengthy discussions, among other things, because of on 
its pro-cyclical impact and the use of private sector rating 
agents. In its ‘standardised approach’, to be used by less 
sophisticated banks, it bases risk weightings on rating 
agents’ assessments. The capital requirements increase with 
the decline in the rating, from 0% for AA-rated (and higher) 
government bonds, or a minimum of 20% for banks and 
corporates up to 150% for ratings of CCC or below. 
However, in the EU’s CRD, the risk weighting is 0% across 
the board for all sovereigns in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) funded in domestic currency. A zero-risk weighting 
means that a bank does not have to set any capital aside for 
these assets. No indication has been given so far that the 
reliance on rating agents for the risk weightings will be 
changed in the Basel III proposals, published on 12 
September 2010.  
Since CRAs were not subject to EU regulation at the time 
the CRD was adopted, the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) issued “Guidelines on the recognition 
of External Credit Assessment Institutions” in January 2006. 
These guidelines set criteria for ‘determining’ external 
credit assessments on the basis of the CRD risk weights. 
The use of a rating agent for the purposes of the CRD is 
thus the prerogative of the national supervisory authorities. 
For comparison, the Japanese FSA has designated five 
rating firms as qualified to calculate risk weights for the 
standardised approach: the Big Three and two smaller 
Japanese firms. 
The use of rating agents is possibly even more prevalent in 
the assessment of marketable assets used as collateral in the 
ECB’s liquidity-providing operations. The credit assessment 
for eligible collateral is predominantly based on a public 
rating, issued by an eligible External Credit Assessment 
Institution (ECAI). In the ECB’s definition, an ECAI is an 
institution whose credit assessments may be used by credit 
institutions for determining the risk weight of exposures 
according to the CRD.5 The minimum credit quality 
threshold is defined in terms of a ‘single A’ credit 
assessment,6 which was temporarily relaxed during the 
financial crisis to BBB-. If multiple and possibly conflicting 
ECAI assessments exist for the same issuer/debtor or 
guarantor, the first-best rule (i.e. the best available ECAI 
credit assessment) is applied.7 
The liquidity categories for marketable assets are subdivided 
into five categories, based on issuer classification and asset 
type, with an increasing level of valuation haircuts, 
depending on the residual maturity.8 An important group of 
                                                        
5 ECB (2006), The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area, General documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy 
instruments and procedures, September, p. 43. 
6 “Single A” means a minimum long-term rating of “A-” by Fitch or 
Standard & Poor’s, or a “A3” rating by Moody’s (see ECB, 2006, p. 
41).  
7 ECB (2008), The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area, General documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy 
instruments and procedures, November, p. 42. 
8 The liquidity categories were changed in September 2008 and the 
valuation haircuts increased in July 2010. See latest changes to risk 
assets in the context of the financial crisis, classified as 
‘category V’, are the asset-backed securities (ABS), or 
securitisation instruments. The extent to which banks used 
ABS collateral in liquidity operations rose dramatically after 
mid-2007, from 4% in 2004 to 18% in 2007 and 28% in 
2008 (Fitch, 2010, p. 7). Within ABS, residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) form the most important element, 
exceeding 50%. These securitisation instruments, and in 
particular the residential mortgage-backed securities 
segment, were an extremely important market for CRAs. 
Moody’s, for example, assigned the AAA rating to 42,625 
RMBS from 2000 to 2007 (9,029 mortgage-backed 
securities in 2006 alone), and later had to downgrade the 
assets. In 2007, 89% of those originally rated as investment 
grade were reduced to junk status.9 
The EU rating agencies regulation 
As the financial crisis erupted, the developments recounted 
above and others rapidly led to a policy consensus that 
rating agents should be regulated at EU level. The proposal 
for a regulation was published in November 2008, and 
adopted in April 2009, a minimum interval in EU decision-
making.10 The regulation was the first new EU legislative 
measure triggered by the financial crisis. It is also one of the 
first financial services measures to be issued as a regulation, 
meaning it is directly applicable, rather than a directive, 
which has to be implemented in national law. 
The EU was not starting from scratch. Back in 2004, further 
to an own initiative report of the European Parliament 
(Katifioris report), the European Commission asked the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) for 
technical advice regarding market practice and competitive 
problems in the CRAs. In a Communication published in 
December 2005, it decided that no legislation was needed 
for three reasons: 1) three EU directives already cover 
ratings agents indirectly: the market abuse Directive, the 
CRD and MiFID; 2) the 2004 Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies,11 published by 
the IOSCO; and 3) self-regulation by the sector, following 
the IOSCO Code.12  
In 2006, in a report for the Commission, the CESR 
concluded that the rating agents largely complied with the 
IOSCO Code.13 But concerns remained regarding the 
oligopoly in the sector, the treatment of confidential 
                                                                                                  
control measures in Eurosystem credit operations, European Central 
Bank, Press notices, 4 September 2008 and 28 July 2010. 
9 According to Phil Angelides, Chairman of the ten-member Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission appointed by the US government to 
investigate the causes of the financial crisis, quoted in Bloomberg, 2 
June 2010. 
10 Regulation 1060/2009 of 16 September 2009, OJ 17.11.2009. 
11 See http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf 
12 Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies 
(2006/C 59/02), OJ C 59/2 of 11.03.2006. It should be added that 
rating agents were exempted from the market abuse directive 
(2003/125/EC) rules on conflicts of interest disclosure, see Di Noia 
and Micossi (2010), p. 65. 
13 CESR’s Report to the European Commission on the compliance of 
Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code, CERS, 06-545 
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information, the role of ancillary services and unsolicited 
ratings. In a follow-up report published in May 2008, 
focusing especially on structured finance, the CESR 
strongly recommended following the international market-
driven approach by improving the IOSCO Code. Tighter 
regulation would not have prevented the problems emerging 
from the loans to the US subprime housing market, 
according to the CESR.  
Notwithstanding the CESR’s advice, the Commission went 
ahead and issued a proposal in November 2008, after two 
consultations in July and September 2008. The EU 
regulation: 
- requires CRAs to be registered and subjects them to 
ongoing supervision; 
- defines the business of the issuing of credit ratings; 
- sets tight governance (board structure and outsourcing), 
operational (employee independence and rotation, 
compensation, prohibition of insider trading, record 
keeping) and conduct of business (prohibition of 
conflicts of interest in the exercise of ratings or through 
the provision of ancillary services to the rated entity) 
rules for CRAs; 
- requires CRAs to disclose potential conflicts of interest 
and its largest client base; 
- requires CRAs to disclose their methodologies, models 
and rating assumptions. CESR is mandated to set 
standards for methodologies and establish a central 
repository with the historical performance data. 
The regulation came into force 20 days after its publication 
in the Official Journal, on 7 December 2009. But guidance 
had to be provided by CESR before the regulation could 
take effect, by 7 June 2010, regarding registration, 
supervision, the endorsement regime, and supervisory 
reporting; and by 7 September 2010, regarding enforcement 
practices, rating methodologies and certification. CESR has 
to report annually on the application. 
The novelty in the regulation is the central role of CESR in 
providing advice regarding the requirement for registration 
by a CRA in an EU member state, and in informing all the 
other member states. The home and host member states to 
the CRA are required to establish a college and are required 
to cooperate in the examination of the application and in 
day-to-day supervision. Host member states are not only 
those where a CRA has a branch, they are also those where 
the use of credit ratings is widespread or has a significant 
impact. In these circumstances, the host country authority 
may at any time request to become a member of the college 
(Art. 29.3). Host countries can also act against an agency 
deemed to be in breach of its obligations (Art. 25). CESR 
has the authority to mediate between the competent 
authorities (Art. 31), which had the effect of pre-empting its 
transformation into a securities market authority under the 
proposals discussed as further to the de Larosière report.14 
                                                        
14 Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 25 February 2009, Brussels. 
As the industry is essentially of US parentage, a focal point 
in the discussions was the third country regime. The 
regulation states that CRAs established in a third country 
may apply for certification, provided that they are registered 
and subject to supervision in their home country, and that 
the Commission has adopted an equivalence decision. 
However, credit ratings issued in a third country can only be 
used if they are not of systemic importance to the EU’s 
financial stability (Art. 5.1), meaning that all large CRAs 
need to be fully registered in the EU system. In addition, 
credit ratings produced outside the EU have to be endorsed 
by the CRA registered in the EU, subject to a series of 
conditions (Art. 4.3). It has been argued that this regime will 
unnecessarily fragment global capital markets. Foreign 
companies will be less inclined to raise capital in the EU, as 
they need a local endorsement of their rating. EU financial 
institutions will invest less abroad, as the ratings on third 
country investments may be seen to be of insufficient 
quality, unless they are endorsed in the EU, or their rating 
agents are equivalent. The regime could also be qualified as 
anti-competitive, as smaller CRA without an EU presence, 
such as the two largest CRAs in Asia, may stop rating EU 
sovereigns and issuers. Establishing a local presence in the 
EU could be too costly, and the client base for these ratings 
would as a result diminish, since they can no longer be used 
by European banks (St. Charles, 2010). 
Box 2. The Dodd-Frank Bill and CRAs 
The new EU regime for CRAs is comparable to the new US 
regime, as introduced by the Dodd-Frank Bill. Whereas the 
US had already legislated the sector in 2006 with the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act, this was a light regime 
requiring CRAs to register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in Washington, D.C., as a Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). The 
Dodd-Frank Bill fundamentally alters this regime by 
requiring tight operational (internal controls, conflicts of 
interest, qualification standards for credit rating analysts) 
and governance requirements, and detailed disclosure 
requirements (including disclosure of the methodologies 
used). The SEC is required to create an Office of Credit 
Ratings to implement the measures of the Bill, to issue 
penalties and to conduct annual examinations and reports.  
Source: Clifford Chance (2010). 
The amendments tabled by the Commission on 2 June 2010 
modify the regulation to accommodate the imminent 
creation of the European Securities Market Authority 
(ESMA), and to further centralise the supervision of 
CRAs.15 ESMA would become the sole supervisor, for the 
sake of efficiency and consistency, doing away with the 
complex system described above. National supervisors will 
remain responsible however for the supervision of the use of 
credit ratings by financial institutions, and can request 
ESMA to withdraw a licence. ESMA can ask the European 
Commission to impose fines for non-respect of provisions 
of the regulations (see Annex III of the proposal). ESMA 
                                                        
15 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on amending regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies, COM(2010) 289/3. 
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may also delegate specific supervisory tasks to national 
authorities. The proposal does however not propose any 
involvement of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), 
which could have been useful in the control of the 
methodologies and the macroeconomic models used by 
CRAs. The draft regulation finally requires issuers of 
structured finance instruments to disclose the same 
information which they have given to the CRA, as is the 
case under the US SEC’s Rule 17g-5. This change was 
welcomed by the markets as it would make both regimes 
convergent. 
The regulatory debate 
The EU’s regulation does not alter the fundamental problem 
that CRAs pose from a public policy perspective: 1) the 
oligopolistic nature of the industry, 2) the potential conflict 
of interest through the issuer-pays principle and 3) the 
public good of the private rating. The EU approach seems to 
be a second-best solution. A more fundamental review is 
needed of the business model of the CRAs, and which other 
industry sectors could provide a useful alternative model. 
On the structure of the industry, the EU increases the 
barriers to entry, by introducing a license and setting tight 
regulation, rather than taking the oligopolistic nature as one 
of the fundamental reasons for the abuses. In addition, since 
statutory supervision of the industry may increase moral 
hazard, it gives a regulatory ‘blessing’ and will further 
reduce the incentives for banks to conduct proper risk 
assessments. It creates the illusion that the industry will live 
to the new rules, and that these will adequately supervised. 
For Pagano & Volpin (2009), the preferred policy is more 
drastic: 1) ratings should be paid for by investors, and 2) 
investors and ratings agencies should be given free and 
complete access to all information about the portfolios 
underlying structured debt securities. The investor-pays 
principle was the rule in the US until the 1970s, but because 
of increasingly complex securities in need of large resources 
and the fear of declining revenues resulting from the 
dissemination of private ratings through new information 
technologies, the issuer-pays principle was introduced. 
Pagano & Volpin do not discuss, however, how to deal with 
free riding. But moving back to the investor-pays principle 
may also require further regulation to prohibit the sale of 
ancillary services by CRAs to issuers. The EU regulation 
goes in the direction of requiring more disclosure (see 
Annex I, Section E of the regulation), but it is questionable 
whether investors will read this. On the contrary, given that 
a supervisory fiat has been given, investors may be even less 
inclined to read all the information, as was demonstrated 
during the financial crisis.  
Making investors pay would bring the ratings agents closer 
to the profession of analysts and investment advisors, which 
is regulated under the EU’s Market in Financial Instruments 
Directive (2004/39). MiFID requires investment advisors to 
be licensed, to act in the best interests of their clients and to 
identify, disclose and avoid conflicts of interest. MiFID also 
states that firewalls must be constructed between analysts 
and sales departments in banks. 
Ponce (2009) discusses an interesting alternative to the 
issuer-pays and investor-pays models: the platform-pays 
model. He demonstrates on the basis of large data sets that 
the transition from the investor-pays to the issuer-pays 
model had a negative impact on the quality of the ratings. 
Under the issuer-pays model, a rating agency may choose a 
quality standard below the socially efficient level. In this 
case, Ponce argues, a rating agency does not internalise the 
losses that investors bear from investing in low-quality 
securities. A rating agent may give ratings to low-quality 
securities in order to increase its revenues. To avoid this, 
Ponce proposes the ‘platform-pays’ model, which takes the 
form of a clearing house for ratings, complemented by 
prudential oversight of ratings’ quality to control for 
bribery. The platform assigns the agent (based on 
performance and experience) and the issuer pays up front. 
This would at the same time overcome the oligopoly 
problem. The problem with this model however is that its 
governance will need to be completely watertight. An 
alternative of this model is the Rating Fund, whereby both 
issuers and investors would contribute to a fund, which 
would assign ratings based upon performance (Kotecha et 
al., 2010). 
Other research finds that more competition would not 
necessarily improve standards, however. New entrants do 
not necessarily improve the quality of ratings – on the 
contrary. They attract business by friendly and inflated 
ratings. As competition reduces future rents, it increases the 
risk of the short-term gains by cheating. In an analysis of the 
corporate bond markets, Becker & Milbourn (2009) find a 
significant positive correlation between the degree of 
competition and the level of the credit ratings (see also 
Figure 1). Concretely, they find a positive correlation 
between Fitch’s entrance in the market and ratings levels, 
without exception. 
Considering that incentives and reputational mechanisms 
are key, Larry Harris (2010) proposes an entirely different 
approach. He takes his inspiration from the bonus debate in 
the banking sector, and proposes to defer a part of the 
payment based on results. Given that credit ratings are about 
the future, the performance of the securities rated would be 
the indicator of the fee CRAs can charge. An important part 
of the fees would be put into a fund, against which the 
ratings agencies could borrow to finance their operations. 
Disclosure of these deferred contingent compensation 
schemes would be required, so that investors can decide for 
themselves which schemes provide adequate incentives.  
Another possibility for creating the right incentives is to 
move to a partnership structure in the rating business, as is 
common in the audit sector. The audit sector has several 
similarities with rating agencies: in the type of work, the 
importance of reputation and global presence, the network 
economies and the oligopolistic structure, and the conflicts 
of interest. The audit sector is regulated by an EU Directive 
(2006/43/EC) that brought the sector under statutory 
supervision. It sets tight rules on governance and quality 
control, and limits the degree of non-audit services that 
audit firms can perform for an audit client.  
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Figure 1. Firm credit ratings distribution: High and low competition in the industry 
 
Source: Becker & Milbourn (2009). 
 
The Directive covering the auditing industry also has an 
important third-country equivalence regime. It is interesting 
to note in this context is that at least two audit firms have 
recently expressed an interest in starting a rating business. 
The downside of the partnership model is the liability 
problem, however, which will deter many from being active 
in that way. 
During the sovereign debt crisis, European and national 
policy-makers have repeatedly raised the possibility of 
‘creating’ local CRAs, eventually even government-
sponsored entities. A state-controlled CRA would lack 
independence, and hence credibility, and, as demonstrated 
above, it is not necessarily more competition that will solve 
the problem. 
Conclusion 
Considering the policy alternatives outlined above, the EU 
and the US should probably have considered the 
specificities of the sector more carefully before embarking 
upon legislation. The legislation that was adopted does not 
alter the business model of the industry and gives rise to 
side effects, the most important of which is the supervisory 
seal. Given the depth of the financial crisis and the central 
role played by ratings agents, certainly in the EU, a more 
profound change would be useful, towards the ‘platform-
pays’ model or a long-term incentive structure, as discussed 
above. 
The EU regulation, as adopted, consolidates the regulatory 
role of CRAs in the EU system, but the price is high. It 
fragments global capital markets, as it introduces a heavy 
equivalence process, and requires a local presence of CRAs 
and endorsement of systemically important ratings. It is at 
the same time protectionist.  
Under the new set-up, CESR and its successor, ESMA, are 
given a central role in the supervision of CRAs, but the 
question is whether they will be able to cope. The supervisor 
needs to check compliance with the basic requirements to 
decide on a licence and to verify adherence to the 
governance, operational, methodological and disclosure 
requirements imposed upon CRAs. This is a heavy 
workload, especially considering that no supervision had 
been in place until a few months ago. Given the present 
debate on the role of CRAs in financial stability and the 
need for technical expertise, the European Systemic Risk 
Board could have been involved, but this seems not to have 
been considered, at least for now. 
On the other hand, the advantage of having a regulatory 
framework in place is that the Commission’s competition 
directorate can start scrutinising the sector from its 
perspective. To our knowledge, the competition policy 
dimensions of the CRA industry in Europe have not been 
closely investigated so far, as no commonly agreed 
definitions and tools were available at EU level, and since 
the sector is essentially of US parentage. EU registration for 
the large CRAs will allow the authorities to check their 
compliance with EU Treaty rules on concerted practices and 
abuse of dominant position. This may raise some feathers. 
What reforms for the credit rating industry? |7 
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